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TOWARD A NEW ERA OF TRANS-PACIFIC ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE: 
 
FOREWORD 
 
Three quarters of a century ago, trans-Pacific energy trade was vigorous, with the United States 
serving as one of Japan’s principal oil suppliers. Indeed, the abrupt American oil embargo of 
1941, in response to Japan’s invasion of Indochina, was a major factor intensifying the 
downward spiral toward war between the two major Pacific powers.  For six decades and more 
following war’s end, trans-Pacific energy interdependence was limited largely to coal and 
nuclear power, although both Canada and the United States came to develop significant 
relationships with Japan in those two vital energy areas. Indeed, Canada became Japan’s largest 
uranium supplier, while the American and Japanese civilian nuclear industries came to be tightly 
intertwined. Yet trans-Pacific gas trade in 2010 still accounted for only 0.3 percent of the 
worldwide total, while trans-Pacific oil trade only constituted 1.2 percent of global totals. 
 This monograph chronicles and analyzes the dawning of a historic new era of deepened 
and broadened interdependence in trans-Pacific energy relations. Two fateful developments 
divide the past of trans-Pacific energy relations clearly from its future, and thus preface that new 
chapter: the Fukushima nuclear tragedy, and the North American shale-gas revolution. The 
former has, since March, 2011, dramatically constrained Japan’s energy supplies, while the latter 
shows significant promise of expanding them. Both developments also inspire important new 
trans-Pacific policy agendas who outlines and implications we are only just beginning to fully 
grasp. 
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 The contributions to follow consider both the momentous technical and economic 
changes now newly underway in trans-Pacific energy relations, and also their policy implications 
for Japan, Canada, and the United States. These three countries comprise an especially important 
unit for energy analysis, as they are all both major democratic, capitalist nations, and also central 
players in the political economy of global energy. The United States and Japan, after all, are two 
of the three largest importers and consumers on earth. At the same time, the United States and 
Canada are also two of the world’s largest oil and natural gas producers, whose productive roles 
are both being enhanced by rapidly rising shale-gas production. Meanwhile, Japan’s role as the 
largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) importer on earth is being further enhanced by the need for 
alternate energy sources in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, creating important new 
complementarities with the Canadian and American roles as major energy exporters. And the 
geopolitical issue of Iran sanctions, against a volatile nation that has traditionally been one of 
Japan’s largest hydro-carbon suppliers, looms in the background as well. 
 The views presented are, as the reader will readily note, written from three distinctly 
different national perspectives: those of Japan, Canada, and the United States. Yet they are 
unified in their belief in the historic nature of the transformations now impending in trans-Pacific 
energy relations, and the importance of market tools in dealing with them. They all agree that the 
major changes in energy flows are likely three to four years away, at least: major capital 
investments in energy have long lead times. Yet they also suggest that the impending changes, 
especially in liquefied natural gas, could have momentous global impact. Most importantly, 
expanded low-cost LNG exports from North America to Japan, and also to China and Korea, 
could put substantial pressure on the oil price linkage in natural-gas contracts upon which Middle 
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Eastern suppliers have traditionally insisted, and which has kept Japanese LNG consumer prices 
comparatively high.   
 The authors all note that some domestic interests in both Canada and the United States 
are ambivalent about trans-Pacific hydro-carbon interdependence. Petro-chemical producers and 
other domestic consumers benefitting from a decline in feedstock prices due to the shale-gas 
revolution naturally desire to see the returns to declining hydrocarbon prices remain at home. Yet 
the authors note that such domestic pressures are weaker in Canada than in the United States, and 
that the two countries are inevitably competitors also in broader global markets. If the United 
States fails to see the benefits of Northeast Asian markets and investments, Canada is very likely 
to capitalize on U.S. inaction. The more constructive strategy for both nations, the papers 
conclude, is thus for both countries to maintain open trade and investment policies with respect 
to trans-Pacific energy, first and foremost with democratic allies such as Japan.  
 These papers were presented at the third trilateral conference on prospects for US-Japan-
Canada mini-lateral cooperation, hosted by the SAIS/Johns Hopkins University Reischauer 
Center for East Asian Studies in Washington, D.C., and co-sponsored by the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (JIIA), and the Asia-Pacific Institute of Canada. The Washington 
conference followed parallel sessions in Vancouver, Canada (October, 2009); and Tokyo, Japan 
(August, 2010), from which many of the key ideas originally evolved. All three conferences 
featured trans-Pacific energy issues as a central concern. The co-sponsors are deeply grateful for 
the generous support, over the past three years, of the Japan Foundation’s Center for Global 
Partnership. The editor is personally grateful, in particular, to three members of the Reischauer 
Center, Mika Brooks, Shinichiro Ichiyama, and Izumi Sano, who contributed greatly to research 
and publication. The editor is also most grateful to key colleagues in this project—JIIA director 
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Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami and Deputy Directors Naoko Saiki and Hideki Asari, as well as 
Research Fellow Asuka Matsumoto, together with Asia Pacific Institute Director Dr. Yuen Pau 
Woo, as well as to Ambassadors Jonathan Fried and Sadaaki Numata, who played a catalytic and 
inspirational role at the very beginning. 
Kent E. Calder 
Washington, D.C. 
June 23, 2012 
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U
SA
 
A
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-1
1 
Sh
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o
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O
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A
n
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l-
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O
il 
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n
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C
h
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C
N
O
O
C
 
C
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ad
a 
O
PT
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O
ct
-1
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C
o
n
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n
ti
o
n
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O
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C
h
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N
O
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C
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ad
a 
D
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h
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N
o
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11
 
Sh
al
e 
G
as
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p
an
 
In
p
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C
an
ad
a 
N
ex
en
 
0.
7 
Fe
b
-1
2 
Sh
al
e 
ga
s 
Ja
p
an
 
Pe
tr
o
ch
in
a 
C
an
ad
a 
En
ca
n
a 
2.
9 
 
K
it
im
at
, B
C
 
N
av
ig
at
in
g 
th
e 
D
ou
gl
as
 C
h
an
n
el
 
 
O
p
p
os
it
io
n
 t
o 
P
ip
el
in
es
 a
n
d
 T
an
ke
rs
 
 
C
an
ad
ia
n
s 
W
il
li
n
g 
to
 L
oo
k 
to
 A
si
an
 M
ar
ke
ts
 t
o 
E
xp
or
t 
E
n
er
gy
 
R
es
ou
rc
es
, b
u
t 
ar
e 
ca
u
ti
ou
s 
ab
ou
t 
F
or
ei
gn
 O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 a
n
d
 
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l C
on
ce
rn
s 
  
D
is
ag
re
e 
Ag
re
e 
6
1%
 
4
7%
 
4
3
%
 
2
6
%
 
2
6
%
 
3
9
%
 
4
4
%
 
5
7%
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 n
e
e
d
s 
to
 a
ct
 n
o
w
 t
o
 
ta
k
e
 a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
A
si
a
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s’
 n
e
e
d
 f
o
r 
e
n
e
rg
y
 
re
so
u
rc
e
s.
 
T
h
e
 p
o
te
n
ti
a
l r
is
k
s 
to
 t
h
e
 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
tr
a
n
sp
o
rt
in
g
 
o
il
 a
n
d
 g
a
s 
fr
o
m
 C
a
n
a
d
a
 t
o
 
A
si
a
 o
u
tw
e
ig
h
 t
h
e
 p
o
te
n
ti
a
l 
e
co
n
o
m
ic
 b
e
n
e
fi
ts
.  
In
 a
ll
 t
h
in
g
s 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 
e
n
e
rg
y
, o
u
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 w
it
h
 
th
e
 U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s 
is
 t
h
e
 m
o
st
 
im
p
o
rt
a
n
t;
 w
e
 s
h
o
u
ld
n
’t
 
v
e
n
tu
re
 t
o
o
 q
u
ic
k
ly
 i
n
to
 A
si
a
. 
T
h
e
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 b
e
n
e
fi
ts
 o
f 
A
si
a
’s
 i
n
v
e
st
m
e
n
t 
in
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
’s
 e
n
e
rg
y
 s
e
ct
o
r 
o
u
tw
e
ig
h
 c
o
n
ce
rn
s 
a
b
o
u
t 
fo
re
ig
n
 o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
 o
f 
o
u
r 
n
a
tu
ra
l 
re
so
u
rc
e
s.
 
So
ur
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: A
si
a 
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ci
fic
 F
ou
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at
io
n 
of
 C
an
ad
a 
20
12
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at
io
na
l O
pi
ni
on
 P
ol
l 
C
an
ad
ia
n
s 
A
re
 S
p
li
t 
ab
ou
t 
F
ac
il
it
at
in
g 
th
e 
T
ra
n
sp
or
t 
of
 O
il
 a
n
d
 G
as
 E
xp
or
ts
 A
si
a 
O
pp
os
e 
Su
pp
or
t 
6
2
%
 
5
3
%
 
4
5
%
 
2
7%
 
3
4
%
 
4
3
%
 
E
n
su
re
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
e
n
e
rg
y
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
h
a
v
e
 t
h
e
 
a
p
p
ro
v
a
l o
f 
a
ff
e
ct
e
d
 F
ir
st
 
N
a
ti
o
n
s 
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s 
B
u
il
d
 p
ip
e
li
n
e
s 
to
 f
a
ci
li
ta
te
 
th
e
 m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
cr
u
d
e
 o
il
 t
o
 
p
o
rt
s 
o
n
 C
a
n
a
d
a
’s
 w
e
st
 c
o
a
st
 
fo
r 
e
x
p
o
rt
 t
o
 A
si
a
 
A
ll
o
w
 t
a
n
k
e
rs
 c
a
rr
y
in
g
 c
ru
d
e
 
o
il
 t
o
 e
n
te
r 
th
e
 w
a
te
rs
 o
ff
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
’s
 w
e
st
 c
o
a
st
 
 
So
ur
ce
: A
si
a 
Pa
ci
fic
 F
ou
nd
at
io
n 
of
 C
an
ad
a 
20
12
 N
at
io
na
l O
pi
ni
on
 P
ol
l 
C
an
ad
a-
U
S-
Ja
p
an
 E
n
er
gy
 I
n
te
rd
ep
en
d
en
ce
? 

C
an
ad
a 
an
d
 t
h
e 
U
S 
al
re
ad
y 
h
av
e 
an
 in
ti
m
at
e 
an
d
 
lo
n
gs
ta
n
d
in
g 
en
er
gy
 r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
.  
It
 is
 in
 t
h
e 
in
te
re
st
 o
f 
bo
th
 c
ou
n
tr
ie
s 
to
 a
ls
o 
fo
rg
e 
a 
tr
an
s-
P
ac
if
ic
 e
n
er
gy
 
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
, s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
or
 t
og
et
h
er
.  
A
p
ar
t 
fr
om
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
en
ef
it
s,
 t
h
er
e 
ar
e 
ot
h
er
 im
p
or
ta
n
t 
fa
ct
or
s 
to
 
co
n
si
d
er
: 

St
re
n
gt
h
en
in
g 
Ja
p
an
’s
 e
n
er
gy
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
, w
h
ic
h
 in
 t
u
rn
 e
n
h
an
ce
s 
th
e 
ov
er
al
l s
tr
at
eg
ic
 r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
 

R
ed
u
ci
n
g 
th
e 
tr
ad
e 
im
ba
la
n
ce
 

Ja
p
an
 h
as
 e
xp
er
ti
se
 in
 c
le
an
 t
ec
h
n
ol
og
y 
an
d
 e
n
er
gy
 e
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 t
o 
sh
ar
e 
w
it
h
 C
an
ad
a 
an
d
 t
h
e 
U
S 

R
ed
u
ci
n
g 
C
an
ad
a’
s 
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
 o
n
 t
h
e 
U
S 
m
ar
ke
t 

P
ro
vi
d
in
g 
a 
ba
si
s 
fo
r 
br
oa
d
er
 a
n
d
 d
ee
p
er
 t
ra
n
s-
P
ac
if
ic
 t
ie
s,
 in
 t
h
e 
co
n
te
xt
 o
f 
gr
ow
in
g 
A
si
an
 r
eg
io
n
al
is
m
  
Su
m
m
ar
y 

T
h
e 
d
is
co
ve
ry
 o
f 
m
as
si
ve
 u
n
co
n
ve
n
ti
on
al
 o
il
 a
n
d
 g
as
 d
ep
os
it
s 
in
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a,
 t
og
et
h
er
 
w
it
h
 s
lo
w
in
g 
en
er
gy
 d
em
an
d
 in
 t
h
e 
U
S 
h
av
e 
m
ad
e 
p
os
si
bl
e 
th
e 
p
ro
sp
ec
t 
of
 e
n
er
gy
 e
xp
or
ts
 
to
 A
si
a 

C
an
ad
a 
h
as
 a
 r
an
ge
 o
f 
en
er
gy
 a
ss
et
s 
th
at
 a
re
 e
xp
or
ta
bl
e,
 I
F
 t
h
e 
p
h
ys
ic
al
 a
n
d
 in
st
it
u
ti
on
al
 
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 is
 p
u
t 
in
 p
la
ce
 

T
h
er
e 
is
 g
ro
w
in
g 
A
si
an
 in
te
re
st
 a
n
d
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 C
an
ad
ia
n
 e
n
er
gy
 a
ss
et
s 

T
h
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 c
as
e 
fo
r 
oi
l a
n
d
 g
as
 e
xp
or
ts
 t
o 
A
si
a 
is
 c
om
p
el
li
n
g,
 b
u
t 
th
e 
w
in
d
ow
 o
f 
op
p
or
tu
n
it
y 
is
 n
ot
 in
d
ef
in
it
e.
   

E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l a
n
d
 F
ir
st
 N
at
io
n
s 
(a
bo
ri
gi
n
al
) 
co
n
ce
rn
s 
ar
e 
m
aj
or
 d
om
es
ti
c 
ch
al
le
n
ge
s 

A
 n
at
io
n
al
 c
on
se
n
su
s 
on
 t
h
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
oi
l a
n
d
 g
as
 e
xp
or
ts
 in
 t
h
e 
C
an
ad
ia
n
 e
co
n
om
y 
an
d
 t
h
e 
n
ee
d
 f
or
 d
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
m
ar
ke
ts
 m
u
st
 b
e 
fo
rg
ed
 in
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
bu
il
d
 t
h
e 
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 t
h
at
 
is
 n
ee
d
ed
 f
or
 s
h
ip
p
in
g 
en
er
gy
 a
cr
os
s 
th
e 
P
ac
if
ic
 

C
re
at
io
n
 o
f 
a 
T
ra
n
s-
P
ac
if
ic
 E
n
er
gy
 M
ar
ke
t 
w
ou
ld
 in
cr
ea
se
 e
co
n
om
ic
 w
el
fa
re
, h
av
e 
p
os
it
iv
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l i
m
p
ac
ts
, c
on
tr
ib
u
te
 t
o 
re
d
u
ci
n
g 
tr
ad
e 
im
ba
la
n
ce
s,
 a
n
d
 im
p
ro
ve
 
en
er
gy
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
 in
 A
si
a.
  

It
 is
 in
 t
h
e 
in
te
re
st
 o
f 
U
S,
 J
ap
an
, a
n
d
 C
an
ad
a 
to
 a
d
va
n
ce
 t
h
e 
id
ea
 o
f 
tr
an
s-
P
ac
if
ic
 e
n
er
gy
 
tr
ad
e 
as
 a
 w
ay
 o
f 
st
re
n
gt
h
en
in
g 
A
si
a-
P
ac
if
ic
 r
el
at
io
n
s.
 

E
n
er
gy
 t
ra
d
e 
h
as
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 in
 v
ir
tu
al
ly
 e
ve
ry
 r
eg
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
w
or
ld
.  
T
h
e 
sa
m
e 
is
 
li
ke
ly
 t
o 
be
 t
h
e 
ca
se
 f
or
 t
ra
n
s-
P
ac
if
ic
 e
n
er
gy
 t
ra
d
e 
–
 m
or
e 
w
or
k 
is
 n
ee
d
ed
 t
o 
u
n
d
er
st
an
d
 
an
d
 a
n
ti
ci
p
at
e 
th
e 
im
p
li
ca
ti
on
s 
of
 a
n
y 
su
ch
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t.
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C
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U
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C
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ril
at
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 C
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: E
m
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ng
 E
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C
h
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n
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 S
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u
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in
 t
h
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N
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ic
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io
n
 
M
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01
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:0
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. 
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m
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m
, S
AI
S,
 W
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ng
to
n,
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.C
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Sh
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IT
O
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ni
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 R
es
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he
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st
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te
 o
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ic
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pa
n 
(I
EE
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I.
  
Th
e 
Fu
tu
re
 o
f 
As
ia
n 
N
at
ur
al
 G
as
 M
ar
ke
ts
 

Le
ss
on
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 3
.1
1 
Fu
ku
sh
im
a 
nu
cl
ea
r 
ac
ci
de
nt
. 

Ch
in
a-
le
d 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
of
 n
at
ur
al
 g
as
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 

Im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
‘s
ha
le
 g
as
 r
ev
ol
ut
io
n’
 
 
II
. R
us
si
a’
s 
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ia
-P
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ifi
c 
Pi
vo
t 

N
ew
 fr
on
tie
rs
 o
f 
of
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ho
re
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yd
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rb
on
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 

Co
nv
er
ge
nc
e 
of
 e
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
se
cu
rit
y 
is
su
es
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A
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at
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al
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ke
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1.
 E
st
im
at
ed
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
N
uc
le
ar
 P
ow
er
 P
la
nt
 S
hu
td
ow
n 

In
cr
ea
se
 in
 f
ue
l i
m
po
rt
s 
in
 F
Y2
01
2 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 F
Y2
01
0:
 

W
ith
 N
uc
le
ar
 

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al
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 －
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M
t 

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ud
e 
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l :
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
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G
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M
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
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Y 
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 b
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W
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N
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
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 :
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M
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
Cr
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l :
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
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G
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
 
 
+
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n 
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=
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lio
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Y
Pr
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tio
n
W
ith
ou
t
N
uc
le
ar
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tu
al
W
ith
 N
uc
le
ar
Tr
ad
e 
Ba
la
nc
e 
of
 Ja
pa
n 
N
uc
le
ar
 s
hu
td
ow
ns
 h
av
e 
le
d 
to
 a
 b
ig
 lo
ss
 o
f 
na
tio
na
l w
ea
lth
 d
ue
 t
o 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
im
po
rt
 p
ric
es
 o
f 
LN
G
 ・
・・
 J
ap
an
 h
ad
 it
s 
fir
st
 t
ra
de
 d
ef
ic
it 
(=
 $
35
 b
ill
io
n)
 in
 m
or
e 
th
an
 t
he
 p
as
t 
th
re
e 
de
ca
de
s.
 
I-
2.
 O
il-
Li
nk
ed
 N
at
ur
al
 G
as
 P
ric
es
 in
 N
or
th
ea
st
 A
si
a 
N
at
ur
al
 G
as
 P
ric
es
 (
20
11
) 
Cr
ud
e 
O
il 
Pr
ic
es
 (
20
08
-1
1)
 

 P
ri
c
e
 i
s
 m
u
c
h
 h
ig
h
e
r 
th
a
n
 e
ls
e
w
h
e
re
 
in
 N
o
rt
h
e
a
s
t 
A
s
ia
. 

 L
N
G
 p
ri
c
e
s
 a
re
 l
in
k
e
d
 t
o
 c
ru
d
e
 
o
il 
p
ri
c
e
s
 i
n
 N
o
rt
h
e
a
s
t 
A
s
ia
. 
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
IE
E
J
 
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
IE
E
J
 
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 
G
a
s
 M
a
rk
e
ts
 
U
S
 G
a
s
 M
a
rk
e
t 
I-
3.
 E
st
im
at
ed
 N
at
ur
al
 G
as
 D
em
an
d 
W
or
ld
 b
y 
Re
gi
on
 
As
ia
 b
y 
Re
gi
on
  
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
A
s
ia
 /
  
W
o
rl
d
 E
n
e
rg
y
 O
u
tl
o
o
k
 2
0
1
1
, 
IE
E
J
. 
I-
4.
 E
st
im
at
ed
 O
il 
D
em
an
d 
W
or
ld
 b
y 
R
eg
io
n 
As
ia
 b
y 
R
eg
io
n 
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
A
s
ia
 /
  
W
o
rl
d
 E
n
e
rg
y
 O
u
tl
o
o
k
 2
0
1
1
, 
IE
E
J
. 
I-
5.
 A
n 
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 N
ew
 D
im
en
si
on
 o
f 
N
at
ur
al
 G
as
  
 
   
  
 F
lo
w
s 
in
 t
he
 A
si
a-
Pa
ci
fic
 R
eg
io
n 
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
B
P
 S
ta
ti
s
ti
c
a
l 
R
e
v
ie
w
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f 
W
o
rl
d
 E
n
e
rg
y
. 
Sh
al
e 
G
as
 
R
ev
ol
ut
io
n 
I-
6.
 L
N
G
 I
m
po
rt
s 
fr
om
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a 
in
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
 

D
ec
. 2
01
1-
 G
ai
l (
In
di
a)
 s
ig
ne
d 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
of
 3
.5
 m
ill
io
n 
to
ns
/y
 fr
om
 
Sa
bi
ne
 P
as
s 
(L
A)
. 

Ja
n.
 2
01
2-
 K
og
as
 s
ig
ne
d 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
of
 3
.5
 m
ill
io
n 
to
ns
/y
 f
ro
m
 S
ab
in
e 
Pa
ss
 (
LA
).
 

Ap
ril
 2
01
2-
 M
it
su
bi
sh
i a
nd
 M
it
su
i  
be
ga
n 
ne
go
tia
tio
n 
ov
er
 im
po
rt
in
g 
a 
to
ta
l 8
 m
ill
io
n 
to
ns
 o
f 
LN
G
 f
ro
m
 H
ac
kb
er
ry
 (
LA
).
  

Ap
ril
 2
01
2-
 T
ok
yo
 G
as
 a
nd
 S
u
m
it
om
o 
be
ga
n 
ne
go
tia
tio
n 
ov
er
 im
po
rt
in
g 
a 
  
 
   
  
 t
ot
al
 2
.3
 m
ill
io
n 
to
ns
 o
f 
LN
G
  
   
  
 f
ro
m
 C
ov
e 
Po
in
t 
(M
D
).
  
 
M
it
su
bi
sh
i, 
Sh
el
l, 
C
N
P
C
,  
   
  
K
og
as
 a
re
 r
ep
or
te
dl
y 
 
   
  
in
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
n 
ov
er
 jo
in
t 
 
   
  
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 L
N
G
  
   
 (
12
 m
ill
io
n 
to
ns
/y
) 
in
  
   
  
Br
iti
sh
 C
ol
um
bi
a.
  
So
ur
ce
: 
 F
ER
C 
I-
7.
 K
ey
 Q
ue
st
io
ns
 f
or
 t
he
 F
ut
ur
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executive summary
Even though oil and gas is the most traded product in the Asia-Pacific region, there is 
virtually no energy trade across the Pacific. The major energy importing economies of 
Northeast Asia source their oil and gas largely from the Middle East, Southeast Asia and 
Australia, while the United States imports energy from the Americas, West Africa, and the 
Middle East. Indeed, transpacific trade in energy products (oil, gas, and coal) accounts for 
only 1.4 percent of global trade in those products. The segmentation of energy markets 
between Asia and the Americas is seen in the sharp price differential for natural gas 
between the two regions, and – more recently – in a price differential for crude oil as well. 
A number of developments in recent years have raised the possibility of transpacific trade 
in oil and gas, and the emergence of a more integrated and competitive market in energy 
products in the Asia-Pacific region. These include: 
 A) The discovery of massive unconventional (shale) gas deposits in the  
  United States and Canada which are creating a gas glut in North America; 
 B) Increased demand in Asian countries for less carbon-intensive  
  energy sources, in particular a shift away from coal to natural gas; 
 C) Concerns about nuclear power following the Fukushima Daiichi disaster  
  and the resulting search for clean alternatives to nuclear energy; 
 D)  The changing energy balance in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia  
  and Malaysia, which are expected to become importers of LNG due to  
  rapid increases in domestic demand; and 
 E) Rapidly growing investment by Asian national oil and gas companies in  
  North American energy assets, especially in the Canadian oil sands,  
  which has the third largest proven reserves of crude oil in the world.
Even taking into account the higher cost of shale gas production, the substantial 
investments required to build pipelines and liquefaction plants, and the transportation 
cost of shipping LNG across the Pacific, North American gas could be competitive in Asia 
against existing suppliers, or at the very least serve as an secondary source of supply for 
Northeast Asian economies looking to diversify their energy imports or seeking more 
secure sources. Likewise, the prospect of North American crude oil exports to Asia 
is increasingly attractive given the gas glut in the United States and a widening price 
differential between benchmark West Texas Intermediate and Brent crude oil prices. 
Favorable economics, however, do not guarantee that transpacific energy trade will become 
a reality, since there are political, regulatory, and environmental risks to be overcome, as 
well as a need for substantial capital investment. Nevertheless, the prospect of transpacific 
energy trade would be good news for Asia-Pacific regional integration, since it would lead 
to a more competitive energy market and more transparent pricing of energy products, 
likely resulting in a reduction in price differentials between Asia and North America. In 
addition, transpacific energy trade would allow both exporters and importers in the region 
to diversify their markets, and hence support energy security objectives.
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Figure 1 illustrates the mix of energy use in some of the major economies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The use of fossil fuels is predominant in the Asia-Pacific region, with hydro-electricity, renewables 
and nuclear energy typically accounting for less than 20% of overall energy use. Oil is the fuel of 
choice in most Asia-Pacific economies (the key exception is China which relies heavily on coal), 
accounting for 30-40% or more of energy needs in most economies. Coal constitutes more than 
20% of overall energy use in the majority of Asia-Pacific economies, while natural gas typically 
accounts for 10-20% of the energy mix (China is again the exception, with only 4% of its energy 
needs met by natural gas).
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The basic patterns of energy use in the Asia-Pacific region are 
unlikely to change materially in the foreseeable future. Figure 2 
illustrates how the energy mix in Asia-Pacific economies (including 
Russia) can be expected to change between now and 2035, under 
IEA’s New Policies Scenario. In this scenario, the use of non-fossil 
fuel sources of energy (nuclear, hydro-electricity and renewables) 
increases appreciably in each of the major economies. Nevertheless, 
fossil fuels continue to dominate the energy mix, accounting for 
60-80% of the energy mix in most economies. The share of coal, in 
particular, as well as oil decreases in almost all countries- particularly 
dramatic is the reduction in the share of coal in China’s energy mix 
from around 70% in 2010 to 38% in 2035. By contrast, natural gas 
shares remain relatively stable, reflecting its status as a cleaner fuel 
relative to oil and coal. 
The significance of energy trade to the Asia-Pacific economies is 
underscored by the fact that much of the fossil fuel needs of Asia 
are met by imports1. In particular, 94.3% of the region’s oil needs 
are met by imports. Natural gas imports are fairly significant, 
accounting for 37.2% of total natural gas use, while coal imports 
are comparatively less significant, only accounting for 14.9% of total 
coal use. Aggregating across all 3 fuels, 41.2% of fossil fuel needs of 
the Asian economies are met from imports.2 
1 In the analysis that follows, Asia is defined 
so as to include Brunei, Cambodia, China, 
China Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, North Korea, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Asia (Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka), South Korea, Chinese Taipei, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea and Oceania.
2 The calculation is carried out by converting 
import and consumption figures for each of the 
3 fuels into a common unit, millions of tones 
equivalent (Mtoe), before summing import and 
consumption figures across each fuel.
04
Section 
ONE
iv
status of asia-Pacific energy trade
To place Asia-Pacific energy trade 
(specifically, fossil fuel energy imports of 
Asian economies) in context, it is useful to 
begin by looking at patterns of global energy 
trade. Figure 3 demonstrates the major inter-
regional oil flows in the global economy in 
2010. By far the largest single flow of crude 
oil trade is from the Middle East (ME) to 
Asia (AS), of around 14.1 million MMBD; 
this reflects both the large base of demand 
in Asia and its limited domestic crudes. 
The only other significant inter-regional 
flows of crude into Asia are from West 
Africa (WAF) and from the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU), approximating 1.5 MMBD 
each. The North American market not only 
produces significant proportions of its own 
crude requirements, but also has access to 
short haul and long haul crudes from Latin 
and Central America (LA, 2.3 MMBD), 
Europe (EUR, 1.0 MMBD, not shown on the 
map), West Africa (1.8 MMBD) as well as 
the Middle East (1.8 MMBD). Europe is a 
recipient of FSU crude (5.9 MMBD), North 
African crude (1.9 MMBD) and ME crude 
(2.3 MMBD), apart from being an exporter of 
crude to other regions. 
Figure 4 illustrates the major flows of 
natural gas (both pipeline and LNG) in the 
world in 2010. In contrast to oil, the global 
gas market is regionally segmented to a 
significant degree, and intra-regional flows 
of gas are important, with gas flows from 
Canada to US (92.4 Bcm), from Southeast 
Asia and Australia (SEA) to Northeast Asia 
(93.9 Bcm) and from Central Asia to Russia 
(31.9 Bcm). The largest flow of gas is from 
Russia and the Central Asian FSU countries 
to Europe (185.7 Bcm), though Europe also 
receives significant gas imports from Africa 
(84.3 Bcm) and the Middle East (45.0 
Bcm). In addition to gas imports from SEA, 
Northeast Asia receives imports from the 
Middle East (46.8 Bcm) and, increasingly, 
from the Former Soviet Union as well (16.0 
Bcm). Note that North and South America 
are effectively ‘gas islands’ isolated from 
the rest of the world, with few significant 
transpacific or transatlantic gas flows.
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Figure 4: Pattern of global gas trade in 2010
Figure 3: Pattern of global oil trade in 2010
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011
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Figure 5: Oil trading pattern in the Asian region in 2010 Figure 6: Gas trading pattern in the Asian region in 2010
Figure 5 shows the areas from which major Asian oil 
importers obtain their product. The Middle East is by 
far the biggest source of oil imports, but there are also 
significant intra-regional flows, while China and India 
import some of their oil from Africa and China also 
imports oil from South and Central America.
Figure 6 illustrates where Asian economies source their gas 
imports. Intra-regional gas flows are the most important, with 
gas flowing from the Southeast Asia belt (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Brunei, and Australia) to Northeast Asia (China, Japan, South 
Korea). The Middle East is the only other significant exporter 
into Asia, accounting for almost all of India’s gas imports and a 
significant proportion of the gas imports of South Korea and, to a 
lesser extent, Japan.
The above figures demonstrate that transpacific energy trade (i.e. trade between North 
America and the Asian economies) is comparatively insignificant relative to both global 
energy trade and energy imports into the Asian region. Transpacific oil and natural gas 
trade are particularly limited in their scale, respectively accounting for only 1.2% of global 
oil trade and 0.3% of global natural gas trade in 2010 (BP Statistical review of World Energy, 
June 2011). Transpacific coal trade is relatively more significant in global coal trade, but 
even so, accounts for only 4.6% of overall trade in coal. Aggregating across all 3 fuels, 
transpacific energy trade only accounts for 1.4% of global energy trade, more than two-
thirds of which is from North America to Asia.
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Compared to the markets in oil and coal, the natural gas market has traditionally been the least integrated, with the global market effectively 
segmented into three regions (Asia, Europe and North America) and trade largely occurring within these regions3. The scale of transpacific natural 
gas trade is particularly small in relation to global gas trade (0.3%), as opposed to 1.2% for oil and 4.6% for coal. Moreover, existing gas flows from 
North America to Asia were largely from the Kenai LNG export terminal in Alaska, which is scheduled to shut down later this year. 
Recent developments in both gas demand and supply have led to a scenario where significant growth in LNG exports from North America to Asia 
has become a distinct possibility. On the demand side, natural gas demand in Asian economies is projected to grow substantially in the next 25 
years, as table 7 above illustrates. One reason is simply the strong economic growth forecast for Asia’s developing economies, in particular China 
and India, which consequently are expected to experience a higher than average CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) in gas demand of over 
5%. Indeed, recent estimates of China’s future natural gas demand by the Institute for International Oil Politics are even more bullish, with demand 
projected to reach 450 bcm by 2020, compared to IEA’s estimate of 395 bcm by 2035. Moreover, the implementation of greenhouse gas policies, 
even at a modest level (as in IEA’s New Policies scenario), favors natural gas over other fossil fuels, which explains why the share of natural gas in 
Asia’s energy mix is expected to nearly double by 2035.
CAGR ShARE
1980 2008 2035 1980-2008 2008-2035 2008 2035
OECD 958 1,541 1,758 1.7% 0.5% 48.9% 38.8%
North America 659 815 913 0.8% 0.4% 25.9% 20.1%
United States 581 662 664 0.5% 0.0% 21.0% 14.6%
Europe 264 555 628 2.7% 0.5% 17.6% 13.8%
Asia 35 170 216 5.8% 0.9% 5.4% 4.8%
Japan 25 100 117 5.1% 0.6% 3.2% 2.6%
Non-OECD 559 1,608 2,777 3.8% 2.0% 51.1% 61.2%
Asia 36 341 934 8.4% 3.8% 10.8% 20.6%
China 14 85 395 6.7% 5.9% 2.7% 8.7%
India 1 42 177 14.3% 5.5% 1.3% 3.9%
Middle East 36 335 608 8.3% 2.2% 10.6% 13.4%
world 1,517 3,149 4,535 2.6% 1.4% - -
table 7: Primary Natural Gas Demand by Region (bcm)
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2010 (New Policies Scenario)
3 This can be visually illustrated by comparing Figures 3 and 4.
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Two other factors could further boost Asia’s future demand for LNG imports. First, Indonesia and Malaysia, two of the largest 
gas exporters in the region, are both experiencing dwindling supply from aging fields. Coupled with increasing domestic natural 
gas demand, both countries appear set to be transformed into LNG importers. Indeed, Indonesia’s first import terminal is 
expected to begin operating in 2012, and private firms have already been given permission to import LNG. Malaysia has planned 
the construction of 3 LNG receiving terminals, and expects to begin importing LNG from 2014. As such, other Asian/Oceania 
economies that currently import gas from Indonesia and Malaysia may well have to scout for new import sources in the future.
Second is the impact of the earthquake in March this year on Japan’s LNG demand. The earthquake not only resulted in the 
shutdown of much of Japan’s nuclear generating capacity, in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, but also damaged oil 
and coal-fired thermal power stations. As Japan seeks to replace its lost thermal and nuclear capacity by running all its gas-
fired units, Japan’s LNG demand has increased and may be expected to continue to do so in the short-run. Whether Japan’s 
LNG demand will grow even further beyond the next 5 years is less clear- while Wood Mackenzie forecasts relatively flat LNG 
demand for Japan in the next decade, Ziff Energy expects strong growth in demand.
Growing demand in Asia for natural gas is also set to be accompanied by a large increase in North American gas production, 
driven by the shale gas revolution which has made feasible the extraction of vast reserves of unconventional gas in the US and 
Canada. An indication of the ‘game-changing’ nature of shale gas is provided by table 8 below, which presents the proved 
reserves of natural gas at the end of 2010. While proved dry-gas reserves of the US only amount to 273 tcf (4% of the world’s 
total), the addition of potential gas reserves (as estimated by the Colorado School of Mines) inflates that figure to 2170 tcf 
(22% of the world’s total); shale gas accounts for 687 Tcf of that figure. Similarly, Canada’s recoverable gas reserves jump 
from 61 tcf to 1338-1407 tcf (14% of the world’s total) if unconventional gas reserves are included. Thus, whereas the US was 
once expected to be a major LNG importer, the EIA now expects US LNG imports to decline progressively as gas demand is 
increasingly met by domestic production. 
tcf Share of total R/P Ratio (yrs)
North America 351 5.3% 12.0
North America (incl. potential reserves) 3525-3594 36-36.5%
US 272.5 4.1% 12.6
US (incl. potential reserves) 2170 22.0-22.2%
Canada 61.0 0.9% 10.8
Canada (incl. potential reserves) 1,338-1,407 13.7-14.3%
S. & Cent. America 262 4.0% 45.9
Europe & Eurásia 2,228 33.7% 60.5
Russian Federation 1,581 23.9% 76.0
Middle East 2,677 40.5% >100
Iran 1,046 15.8% >100
Qatar 894 13.5% >100
Africa 520 7.9% 70.5
Asia / Oceania 574 8.7% 37
Australia 103 1.6% 58.0
Indonesia 108 1.6% 37.4
Malaysia 85 1.3% 36.1
world 6,609 58.6
world (incl. NA potential reserves) 9,784-9,853
table 8: Natural Gas Proved Reserves, end 2010 (US & Canada unconventional gas included)
Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011, Colorado School of Mines (2011) as cited in WGI (World Gas Intelligence),  
4 May 2011; Energy Futures Network and Canadian Society of Unconventional Gas (2011) as cited in WGI, 9 Mar 2011.
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The effect of the North American gas 
glut coupled with the Asian demand 
surge has been to widen natural gas 
price differentials between North 
America and Asia. Historically, natural 
gas in the Asia-Pacific region has been 
priced at a premium relative to North 
American natural gas (see Figure 9). 
Several factors have contributed to the 
Asian premium- the absence of multiple 
import sources, the fact that gas is 
purchased under long-term contracts 
and finally the use of oil-indexed 
formulas to determine the prices of 
natural gas contracts. As Figure 9 
illustrates, however, in the last few years 
the price differentials have widened 
considerably. The difference between 
the Japan contract price and the Henry 
Hub price in 2010 was approximately 
$6.40, and is estimated to have 
increased even further in 2011 to around 
$12.50 due to the oil price hike as well 
as the increase in Japan’s LNG demand 
following the Fukushima disaster.
With such large price differentials, gas 
exports from North America to Asia 
are increasingly attractive to investors, 
resulting in a number of export projects 
in both the US and Canada (table 10). 
All of the projects proposed in Canada 
are new terminals to be located on 
the West Coast in British Columbia, 
with access to the vast reserves of 
mostly unconventional gas in the 
Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin 
(WCSB) that span over the provinces 
of Alberta and British Columbia. In 
contrast, the US export projects largely 
involve re-purposing existing import 
terminals on the Gulf and East Coast 
into bi-directional terminals that 
can both export and import LNG.
Project Country Location Export Capacity  
(in million tons per year)
Expected  
Starting Date
Kitimat LNG Canada West Coast 10.0 2015
BC LNG Canada West Coast 15.0 2015
Petronas/Progress Canada West Coast - 2016-18
Douglas Chanel LNG Canada West Coast 1.8 2014
Sabine Pass LNG  
(Cheniere)
USA Gulf Coast 16.0 2015
Freeport LNG USA Gulf Coast 15.0 > 2015
Lake Charles  
(BG)
USA Gulf Coast 17.6 -
Cove Point LNG  
(Dominion)
USA East Coast - -
Jordan Cove LNG,  
Oregon
USA West Coast - -
table 10: Proposed LNG export projects in North America
Figure 9: Natural gas prices in North America and Asia
Sources: WGI (24 Nov 2010), WGI (02 Feb 2011), WGI (23 Mar 2011), WGI (20 Apr 2011), WGI (11 May 2011),  
Nexant (May 2011), Oregon Live (16 Jul 2011), WGI (17 Aug 2011)
notes: The Henry Hub and Japan spot prices for 2011 are the averages for the first six months of 2011.  
 The Japan contract price for 2011 is calculated using the assumed formula: Contract price = 0.1485* 
 Average JCC crude price for 1st 6 months of 2011 + 1.0. The formula is derived from Gary Eng  
 (www.med.govt.nz/upload/65505/Formula_for_LNG_Pricing.pdf, 2008), and is consistent  
 with recent estimates of the oil slope amounting to 0.14-0.1485 (WGI, 17 Aug 2011).
Sources: Nexant (2011), WGI (various issues, 2010-2011), Petroleum Association of Japan (2011)
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notes: 
The Japan contract price and 
the Henry Hub price (i.e. home 
price for the US) refer to 2011 and 
are calculated as described in 
the notes to Figure 9. The home 
price for Canada refers to the 
Alberta average spot price for 
2010 (Nexant, 2011). The costs 
of liquefaction, shipping and 
fuel surcharge are estimated by 
Barclays (Platts, 13 Apr 2011). 
The fuel surcharge is a fee paid to 
the hauler to cover the fuel costs 
incurred while shipping and is 
calculated as a fixed percentage 
of fuel prices so as to cushion the 
hauler from changes in fuel prices.
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outlook for  
north american lng exPorts to asia
In evaluating the outlook for North American LNG export projects, a key question is 
whether exports from the USA or Canada to Asia are economically viable. The step-chart 
in Figure 11 illustrates the estimated prices at which LNG exported by US and Canada 
break even, and compares it to the actual price that LNG exporters can hope to obtain if 
they sell LNG to Japan under long-term contracts. At current prices, the break-even export 
price is approximately $9.60/MMBtu for US Gulf Coast terminals and $7.40/MMBtu 
for Canadian export terminals, both of which are considerably less than the estimated 
Japanese contract price of $16.70. Thus, at current prices it makes economic sense for 
gas producers in North America to export LNG to Asia as opposed to selling the gas 
domestically, with estimated profit margins of $9.35/MMBtu for Canadian exporters and 
$7.15/MMBtu for US exporters. 
Independent of the price of natural gas in North America and Asia, it is estimated that US 
terminals will require a minimum price differential of US$5.35/MMBtu (between Henry 
Hub prices and Asian LNG prices) for US LNG exports to be economically feasible4, while 
the corresponding price differential required for Canadian terminals (i.e. the difference 
between Alberta prices and Asian LNG prices) is US$3.35/MMBtu. Canadian terminals 
(and any terminals on the US West Coast) thus have a substantial cost advantage over 
terminals on the US Gulf Coast due to the difference in shipping distances to Asia -- 
transportation costs for West Coast export terminals are only $1/MMBtu versus $3/
MMBtu for the Gulf Coast terminals. The impetus for Canada to export gas is also greater 
than for the US due to the presence of domestic push factors. Most of the gas demand in 
North America is in the U.S., and with US gas production increasing Canada’s gas exports 
to the US have been steadily declining. 
In view of the large reserves of unconventional gas in both Canada and the US (table 8), 
there are unlikely to be any physical constraints on gas production. Liquefaction capacity, 
however, is the key capacity constraint. Projected liquefaction capacities of Canada and 
the US are presented in table 12 together with those of Qatar, Australia and Russia (which 
are likely to be the other key competitors in the Asia-Pacific LNG market).
Figure 11: Cost buildup for breakeven prices for US and Canada LNG exports to Japan, 2011
US LnG 
Break-even 
Price
Canada LnG 
Break-even Price
Canada Costs
US Costs
Japan Contract Price
Required Price 
Differentials:
Canada: $3.35 
US: $5.35
Sources:  
Nexant (May 2011),  
Platts (13 Apr 2011),  
WGI (various issues, 2011), 
Petroleum Association of  
Japan (2011)
4 Note that this is consistent with the $5.40/MMBtu that Cheniere Energy (operator of Sabine Pass LNG) estimates  
 will be added to Henry Hub prices when gas is exported to Asia (WGI, 20 Apr 2011).
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Despite the wide variability in the estimates, it is clear that 
the liquefaction capacity of Qatar and Australia will exceed 
that of North America in the medium-term (i.e. up to 2016) 
and quite likely in the long-run as well. Nevertheless, even 
conservative estimates of North America’s liquefaction 
capacity represent a sizeable chunk of the total liquefaction 
capacity that is to be used to direct LNG exports to Asia5. 
Thus, the possibility of profitable exports to Asia, coupled with 
growing liquefaction capacity, underscores the significant 
potential for large volumes of transpacific gas trade.
The actual volume of transpacific LNG trade in the medium-
term may be constrained by the cost advantage of existing 
LNG suppliers such as Qatar (and to a lesser extent, Australia), 
who have the luxury of reducing their prices to aggressively 
compete against North American exporters as well as the 
“first mover” advantage of existing suppliers to enter into 
long-term contracts for the rapidly growing demand for LNG, 
especially for Japan, in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. 
However, a desire for energy security on the part of Asian 
buyers might lead to significant North American LNG exports 
despite higher prices compared to existing supplies. Buying 
North American gas would allow Asian buyers possibilities 
for diversification by including multiple indices in their gas 
portfolio, and might further reduce risks for buyers given that 
North American gas prices (e.g. Henry Hub prices) are less 
volatile than the JCC crude price. 
There are also regulatory risks in Canada and the United 
States related to environmental concerns around the 
hydraulic fracking process that is used in the recovery of 
shale gas, and opposition from large buyers of natural gas in 
the US, including Dow Chemical and American Public Gas 
Association, which have opposed LNG export plans on the 
grounds that they would lead to higher domestic prices and 
expose the domestic gas market to the potentially unstable 
global crude oil market. 
Country
Capacity in 
2011
Projected 
Capacity 
(2015-16)
Projected 
Capacity 
(2020+)
Qatar 77 77 77
Australia 20 60-70 60-160
north America 2 12-34 26-113
 Canada 0 5-27 10-50
 US 2 7 16-63
Russia  
(northeast Asia)
10 10-15 10-25
Sources: Capacity estimates for Qatar were compiled from Petroleum Economist (Feb 2011) and Nexant 
(2011); for Australia from Nexant (2011), Petroleum Economist (Jul 2011), APPEA and Deutsche Bank (both 
cited in Business Times, 12 Apr 2011); for Russia from Nexant (2011) and WGI (30 Mar 2011) and for North 
America from Nexant (2011), WGI (17 Aug 2011) and Table 10 in this paper. 
For the lower bounds of the 2015 and 2020 estimates, we assume that Kitimat LNG in Canada and 
Sabine Pass LNG are partially operational by 2015 and fully operational by 2020. For the upper bounds, 
we assume that all proposed projects are completed on schedule.
5 Note that Australia exports LNG almost exclusively to  
 Asia / Oceania (BP, 2011); Asia / Oceania remains  
 the most attractive market for Qatar while Russia’s  
 Northeast Asian LNG export terminals are very likely  
 to cater only to Asia and Oceania.
table 12: Liquefaction capacities of potential exporters to Asia (million tons per year)
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Regardless of actual export 
volumes, the prospect of 
significant north American LnG 
exports is likely to have an impact 
on gas price differentials and oil-
gas price differentials in the region.
Asian LNG importers currently do not 
have access to a competitive market. 
Japan and South Korea source their 
LNG imports from a limited number of 
countries which hold significant market 
power. This market power is further 
enhanced by the pricing formulas 
of most long-term LNG contracts, 
which tie natural gas prices to the 
price of crude oil. While oil indexing 
was logical in the 1960s when natural 
gas used to be a substitute for home 
heating oil, natural gas today tends 
not to be a substitute for oil and the 
earlier logic behind indexation no 
longer holds. Instead, oil-indexed 
prices allow suppliers to assert their 
market power by charging high prices, 
partly because of high crude prices 
but also because such formulas can 
serve to aggregate the market power 
of a number of producers by providing 
an implicit collusive mechanism -- if 
all suppliers utilize oil-indexation (and 
crude oil prices are high enough), LNG 
prices will be maintained at high levels, 
to the benefit of all LNG exporters 
and LNG exporting countries.
Given the oligopolistic nature of the 
Asian LNG market and the high Asian 
gas price, the entry of North American 
producers into the Asian LNG market 
will challenge the market power of 
existing producers and threaten to 
capture some of their market share. At 
the same time, though, the break-even 
prices for North American producers 
are higher than those for producers 
from countries such as Qatar. In such a 
scenario, a rational response by existing 
producers will be to reduce the price 
they charge Asian buyers, so as to price 
North American producers out of the 
market while continuing to maintain 
their share of the market (albeit with 
lower prices and therefore lower 
profits). There are already indications 
that Qatari gas producers behave in the 
manner described above. In response 
to the growing threat of Australian 
competition, Qatar has recently reduced 
its price demands towards Japan 
even in spite of the post-Fukushima 
surge in Japan’s LNG demand.
One way Asian prices might decrease, 
in response to the entry of North 
American producers, is through 
adjustments to oil-indexation formulas 
(e.g. a decrease in the slope in a typical 
formula). What is unique about the 
North American gas supply push, 
however, is that it may eventually 
challenge the very basis of Asian 
LNG pricing- the use of oil-indexed 
formulas. North American gas prices 
are not oil-indexed and thus provide 
their own alternative benchmarks for 
pricing (e.g. Henry Hub pricing). Given 
the large differential between oil and 
gas prices in North America, prices of 
North American LNG based on gas-hub 
indices are likely to be much lower than 
prices determined using traditional 
oil-indexed formulas, which could 
lead buyers to increasingly explore 
alternative pricing mechanisms for 
contract LNG. Although oil-indexation 
formulas are likely to stay, if pricing 
based on North American gas-hub 
prices is adopted at some point in 
the future due to the influx of North 
American exports, Asian prices (and 
therefore price differentials between 
Asia and North America) are likely to 
fall, independently of whether sellers 
pursue a strategy of lowering prices 
in order to maintain market share. 
Furthermore, price differentials can 
be expected to decline because of a 
potential shift in the balance between 
contract and spot LNG prices used by 
Asian buyers. While contracted LNG 
has been the traditional mainstay, a 
number of economies have recently 
demonstrated an increased openness 
to purchasing spot LNG. For instance, in 
the aftermath of the March earthquake, 
Japanese buyers have tended not to 
rush into new long-term contracts, 
relying instead on spot LNG and LNG 
from short-term contracts to cover up 
for lost nuclear and thermal capacity. 
North America’s entry into the Asian 
LNG market, by providing Asian buyers 
with an additional source of LNG 
supplies, might persuade them to buy 
a greater proportion of their LNG from 
spot markets. The fact that Henry 
Hub spot prices are far lower than 
contract LNG prices would mean that 
the average price paid by Asian buyers 
for their LNG would decline (even if 
contract prices remained the same).
12
Section 
ThREE
ProsPects for transPacific  
oil and coal trade
03
SECtion
In general, prospects for transpacific oil 
and coal trade are relatively muted in 
comparison to natural gas trade. According 
to IEA’s projections, the share of coal in the 
energy mix of all the major Asian economies 
will decline substantially, as we saw in 
Figure 2. On the other hand, in absolute 
terms, Asia’s coal consumption is projected 
to increase substantially (from 2601 Mtce 
in 2008 to 4081 Mtce in 2035), driven by 
increases in coal consumption in China, 
India and Indonesia. While consumers of 
coal have not been as reliant on imports 
as oil and natural gas consumers (recall 
that only 14.9% of the Asia’s coal needs 
are met by imports), the importance of 
imports to coal has been rising in this region, 
with China becoming a net coal importer 
in 2009 for the first time. By contrast, 
OECD countries such as the USA and 
Japan will reduce their coal demand over 
the next 25 years (World Energy Outlook 
2010, International Energy Agency), thus 
increasing the supply of coal available for 
exports in such countries. The combination 
of the growth in demand in Asia (largely 
China and India) and the increased net 
supply in North America (largely USA) 
raises the possibility of transpacific 
coal trade, with the USA potentially 
selling coal on a major basis to China.
However, the Energy Information 
Administration (2010) points out a number 
of reasons why a significant rise in US 
coal exports to China is unlikely. The main 
reason is that the US produces coal at a 
relatively high cost, and is thus a “swing” 
supplier in the international coal trade 
market, only exporting to other countries 
when the price increases. Geographical 
factors also come into play- the global coal 
market is effectively segmented into the 
Atlantic and the Pacific regions, and the 
US is only a marginal player in the former 
whilst rarely participating in the latter. 
Exporting coal from the West Coast, an 
attractive idea in theory since it would 
result in reduced transportation costs, is 
rendered unlikely by the absence of a large 
dedicated coal terminal on the West Coast. 
As for China’s new status as an importer, 
it is likely to import its coal requirements 
from Australia, Russia, Mongolia and 
Mozambique, rather than from the US.
Prospects for transpacific oil trade are 
somewhat more upbeat, in particular 
for Canada which has plentiful oil sands 
deposits in the state of Alberta. In fact, 
according to IEA, even the US has the 
potential to become an oil exporter, with 
an additional production of 500,000 
barrels a day from oil shale fields in Texas 
and North Dakota (New York Times, 16 
Jun 2011). However, given that the US 
continues to import significant quantities 
of oil from the Middle East, Africa and Latin 
America (see Figure 3), increased US oil 
production is more likely to be substituted 
for imports rather than exported. 
Canada seems the more likely candidate to 
export oil to Asia. Canada can increase its 
oil production by 1.3 million barrels a day 
according to IEA, so supply is certainly not 
an issue. The key choice for Canadian oil 
producers is between exporting oil south 
to the US and west to Asia. Currently 
Canada is almost entirely reliant on a 
single market- the US - for selling its oil, 
with exports to US accounting for close to 
98% of its overall oil exports (BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy, June 2011). Exporting 
oil to Asia would provide Canada with 
the benefits of diversification and reduce 
its reliance on a single market for oil.
There are also purely economic reasons 
favoring export of oil from Canada to Asia. 
Firstly, the costs of transporting oil to 
China, Japan, S Korea and Chinese Taipei 
(via pipeline and tanker) are lower than 
the costs of transporting oil to US (via 
pipeline). Secondly, while crude market 
prices generally tend to match each other 
quite closely, in the past year or so a 
differential has opened up between WTI 
prices and crude oil prices in the rest of 
the world. Starting from 2010, the JCC 
crude price has inched ahead of the 
WTI price. The new oil price differential 
(a result of the relative oil supply glut 
in North America and in particular 
Canada), though small in relative terms, 
also favors Canadian oil exports to Asia. 
The economic advantages of Canadian 
oil exports to Asia, however, must be 
balanced against the fact that oil produced 
from oil sands is less fungible than 
sweeter grades from traditional sources.
The biggest obstacles to Canadian oil 
exports to Asia, however, have to do with 
environmental and regulatory issues. There 
is domestic and international opposition 
to the oil sands in general due to the 
environmental impacts, even though these 
concerns are highly unlikely to bring further 
development of the oil sands to a complete 
standstill. The more immediate roadblock 
is opposition to the proposed Northern 
Gateway Pipeline that would transport oil 
from the Athabasca oil-sands in Alberta 
to Kitimat, British Columbia on the Pacific 
coast, for onward shipment to Asia.
If North American crude oil exporting 
capacity can be achieved, it is likely that 
there will be a narrowing of the differential 
in WTI and Brent/JCC crude prices, 
similar to the reduction in natural gas 
price differentials between North America 
and Asia. The price spread in crude oil 
is a relatively recent phenomenon, but 
it is a function of the same fundamental 
causes that affect gas price differentials, 
namely surplus energy supply in North 
America coupled with the very limited 
ability (especially for Canada) to export 
oil to destinations outside the continent. 
In recent months, the spread between 
Brent and WTI prices has widened 
to as much as US$25 a barrel.
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table 13: Investments by Asian oil & gas companies in North American oil and gas industry
Source: Wall Street Journal (31 Jan 2011), Business Times (11 Feb 2011), Financial Times (22 Mar 2011), Financial Times (13 Apr 2011), and Wall Street Journal (20 Jul 2011)
Date Category
investing 
country
investing 
company
Recipient 
country
Project/  
company
Valuation  
(in billion US$)
May-05 Oil sands China CNOOC Canada MEG 0.2
Aug-06 Oil sands S Korea KNOC Canada Black Gold 1.7
Apr-10 Oil sands China Sinopec Canada Syncrude 4.6
Nov-10 Oil sands Thailand PTT Canada Kai Kos Dehseh 2.3
Jan-11 Shale gas & oil China CNOOC USA Chesapeake 0.6
Jan-11 Pipeline China Sinopec Canada
Northern  
Gateway Pipeline
2.3
Feb-11 Shale gas China Petrochina Canada Encana 6.9
Feb-11 Shale gas India Reliance USA Atlas, Chevron 3.2
Mar-11 Shale gas & oil S Korea KNOC USA Anadarko 1.6
Jul-11 Oil sands China CNOOC Canada OPTI Canada 2.1
In addition to growing interest in transpacific energy exports from 
North America to Asia, the past few years have also featured a 
trend of increasing capital and equity investments by Asian 
state-owned oil & gas companies in the North American oil and 
gas industry. Table 13 below summarizes some of the key recent 
investments that have been made. Almost all of the investments 
have been in unconventional oil and gas resources.
Most of these investments are likely motivated by straightforward 
profit-maximizing interests that take into account the growth 
prospects of shale gas and oil, as well as oil sands. In the case of 
oil sands, rising crude oil prices imply greater profits from those 
investments. Investments in shale gas are harder to defend from 
a profit-maximizing perspective, given the low price of natural gas 
in North America, if there is no intention of exporting the gas to 
higher paying markets. 
It is likely, therefore, that some of the Asian investments in 
unconventional gas are motivated by broader objectives. One 
source of motivation could be the desire to acquire experience 
and technical know-how to develop similar unconventional gas 
fields in home economies. China, for example, is known to have 
substantial shale gas reserves, even though these are in remote 
areas that do not have access to the vast amounts of water that 
are needed for hydraulic fracking. 
Furthermore, some of the investments appear to be tailored 
towards securing Asian oil and gas imports. Sinopec’s investment 
in the Northern Gateway Pipeline (which, if completed, would 
allow the transport of heavy oil to the west cost for onward 
shipment to Asia) appears to be motivated by a desire to secure a 
new import source for oil. In the same way, the recent initiative by 
Petronas to set up an LNG export terminal in Canada (see Table 
10 above) is likely motivated by a similar desire to for access to a 
secure long-term energy source. 
Hence there are important synergies between the North 
American drive to export LNG to Asia, and the Asian drive to 
invest in the North American oil and gas industry. Both these 
trends point to an important conclusion - North America and 
Asia are becoming increasingly interdependent in energy terms, 
with each having a stake in the other’s energy sector. North 
American LNG exports to Asia could mean that the Asian and 
North American gas markets will no longer be disconnected, with 
prices in one market affecting prices in the other. By the same 
token, Asian investments in North American unconventional oil 
and gas industry will mean that both Asia and North America 
will have a stake in how the unconventional gas boom in North 
America plays out. 
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THE EMERGING TRANS-PACIFIC ENERGY ECONOMY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
 
By 
Kent E. Calder 
SAIS/Johns Hopkins University 
 
Energy was at once a strategically crucial and a conflicted agenda for the twentieth century, 
serving as a major catalyst for global military conflict, and for two major Oil Shocks to the 
industrialized world as well. So it promises to be, albeit in hopefully more pacific fashion, across 
the twenty-first century as well. Energy supply and price remain among the most important 
parameters of global economic life, for producers and consumers alike.  
Few major democratic, capitalist nations are more central in the political economy of 
global energy than the United States, Japan, and Canada. The United States and Japan are two of 
the three largest oil importers and consumers on earth.
1
 Simultaneously, the United States and 
Canada are also two of the world‟s largest oil and natural-gas producers. Their productive roles 
are being enhanced by rapidly rising shale-gas production in both countries, and the future 
prospect of substantial exports. Meanwhile Japan‟s role as the largest liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) importer on earth is being further magnified by the need for alternative energy sources in 
the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, creating important new complementarities with the 
Canadian and American roles as major energy exporters. 
                                                          
1  The U.S. is the largest oil consumer in the world in 2010 (21.1 percent of the global total), followed by China (10.6 percent) 
and Japan (5.0 percent). The three countries are also the world‟s largest oil importers, with 21.8 percent, 11.1 percent, and 8.5 
percent of world oil imports respectively. See BP. Statistical Review of World Energy, June, 2011 edition, p. 9 and p. 18. 
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The Trans-Pacific Energy Economy in Historical Context 
For the first four decades of the twentieth century, the United States was an important supplier of 
energy to Japan, particularly in the form of oil. The end of that interdependence on the eve of 
World War II arguably accelerated the onset of military conflict.
2
 After World War II, American 
majors such as Standard Oil of New Jersey, Mobil, and Texaco held a central role as distributors 
of petroleum products in Japan for over three decades, but the actual flow of energy imports into 
Japan was mainly from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, rather than the United States. Even 
when oil and gas were discovered in large quantities on the North Slope of Alaska in the 1970s, 
domestic interest-group pressures within the U.S. made the economically rational export of oil to 
Japan politically impossible.
3
 
Both the U.S. and Canada have of course exported substantial amounts of coal to Japan 
for years, and Canada has exported significant amounts of uranium as well. Indeed, Canada has 
recently been Japan‟s largest source of uranium supply. Yet hydrocarbon exports from North 
America to Japan have been limited, and, in the case of the United States, non-existent. 
For more than seventy years—since the U.S. oil embargo of 1941, on the eve of World 
War II—the United States has not engaged in significant hydro-carbon exports to Japan. More 
generally, oil and natural-gas trade across the Pacific has been virtually non-existent—trans-
Pacific gas trade in 2010, for example, accounted for only 0.3 percent of the worldwide total, 
while trans-Pacific oil trade only constituted 1.2 percent of global totals.
4
 Yet that un-integrated 
pattern, in the wake of historic developments on the two shores of the Pacific—the shale-gas 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Daniel Yergin. The Prize:The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power. New York: Touchstone Books, 1991, pp. 
305-327. 
3 See DOE/NETL. Alaska North Slope Oil and Gas—A Promising Future or an Area in Decline? at: 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/EPreports/ANSSummaryReportFinalAugust2007.pdf.   
4 BP. Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011 edition, p. 18.  
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revolution and the post-Fukushima energy transformation in Japan—appears to be changing in 
dramatic fashion. Suddenly, the prospects for an era of true trans-Pacific energy interdependence, 
fraught with important geostrategic implications, appears to be emerging. 
To fully understand the new profile of trans-Pacific energy interdependence and its 
historic policy and geopolitical implications, it is important to review the embedded patterns of 
energy supply and demand prevailing in the United States, Japan, and Canada. Following that 
survey, this paper then considers economic prospects for the new era of deepening trans-Pacific 
energy interdependence. In conclusion, it enumerates the strategic benefits of the emerging trans-
Pacific energy relationship, and reviews policy issues which the new trans-Pacific energy 
economy evokes.  
North America and Japan in the Global Energy Economy Today 
To fully appreciate emerging policy issues in U.S.-Japan-Canada energy relations, it is important 
first to grasp concretely the role of these three nations in the broader global energy economy. As 
noted previously, and in Figure I, the US and Canada are major energy producers, while the US 
and Japan are major energy consumers and importers. The US and Canada both have substantial 
untapped coal and shale gas reserves, while Canada also has substantial un-utilized export 
capacity with respect to non-conventional oil and uranium. 
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FIGURE I: U.S., JAPANESE, AND CANADIAN ENERGY TRADE IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2010) 
Country 
Oil 
[tb/d] 
Natural Gas 
[bcm] 
Coal Uranium 
United States 
Ex:   2,154 
Im: 11,689 
Net: - 9,535 
Ex:   31.98 
Im: 105.48 
Net:  -73.50 
Exporter Little Trade 
Canada 
Ex:   2,599 
Im:       846 
Net: +1,743 
Ex:   92.40 
Im:   22.91 
Net: +69.49 
Exporter Exporter 
Japan 
Ex:      302 
Im:   4,567 
Net: -4,265 
Ex:        [0] 
Im:   93.48 
Net: -93.48 
Importer Importer 
World total 
Ex: 53,510 
Im: 53,510 
Net: 0 
Ex: 975.22 
Im: 975.22 
Net: 0 
  
Source:  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011 edition. 
Notes: 
(1)  tb/d = thousand barrels per day, bcm = billion cubic meters per year, Ex = Export, Im = Import 
(2)  Japan‟s natural gas exports assumed to be 0. 
(3)  „+ (plus)‟ indicates exports and „-(minus)‟ indicates imports. 
 
Japan’s Energy “Angst” 
As the data above suggest, Japan and its North American partners stand in radically contrasting, 
and yet complementary, relations to the global energy economy. Japan is a massive importer of 
all variety of energy inputs—Canada and the United States are largely exporters, although the 
US also does import substantial amounts of oil. To compound Japan‟s energy vulnerabilities, its 
economy is highly energy intensive, and it is radically dependent for hydro-carbon supplies on 
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the Middle East. Indeed, close to 80 percent of its oil imports come from the Persian Gulf, 
compared to only around 15 percent for the United States.
5
 
This radical Japanese dependence on the Middle East is driven by both geography and 
energy economics. The Persian Gulf is directly accessible to Japan, via the Strait of Malacca and 
the Indian Ocean, while both supply and price of Gulf oil are relatively predictable. Despite the 
past predictability, Japanese are nervous about two aspects of the Middle East situation: rising 
competition from other East Asian demandeurs, including China and South Korea; as well as the 
apparently waning geopolitical role of the United States in the region. Especially in the wake of 
the Fukushima accident, which is forcing them to seek alternatives to nuclear power, and to 
procure more and more LNG, over-reliance on the Persian Gulf is making them increasingly 
nervous.   
Three forms of energy have historically assuaged Japanese misgivings about heavy 
energy dependence on the Persian Gulf: coal, nuclear power, and natural gas. The first of these, 
however, has become more problematic in recent years, due to increasing concerns about global 
climate change. The second is at least temporarily impractical, in the wake of Fukushima. That 
leaves the third: natural gas.  
Natural gas, felicitously, is suddenly available from a new, non-Middle Eastern source—
North America—thanks to the emergence of shale gas. And it is available precisely as the need 
for it is intensified by the Fukushima accident. Almost unbelievably, it is also available at 
potentially very reasonable prices, with the spot price of LNG in North America, excluding 
                                                          
5 Japan obtained 79.7 percent of its total oil imports from the Middle East in 2010, while the United States obtained only 14.9 
percent from that region. See BP. Statistical Review of World Energy, June, 2011 edition, p. 18. 
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transportation costs, hovering around one fourth of contract price levels prevailing in Japan that 
included those costs.
6
 
Prospects for Future Trans-Pacific Energy Interdependence 
Given trans-Pacific LNG price trends of the past two years, driven by the shale-gas revolution in 
North America and the Fukushima accident in Japan, natural gas trade across the Pacific is now 
economically feasible. The infrastructural obstacles, of course, are not inconsequential: (1) 
greater gasification capacity in Japan, (2) green-field liquefaction facilities along Canada‟s West 
Coast to process natural gas exports; and (3) significant technical modifications on LNG import 
terminals along the U.S. East and Gulf coasts, to make them suitable instead for LNG exports 
across the Pacific. Yet the long-term economic logic makes trans-Pacific trade in natural gas at 
last economically feasible. 
In April 2012, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorized the 
construction and operation of up to four modular LNG trains for the liquefaction of domestically 
produced natural gas at the Sabine Pass LNG terminal in Cameron Parish, Louisiana
7
, following 
Department of Energy authorization to export LNG to FTA countries in September 2010, and to 
non-FTA countries in May 2011.
8
 The Sabine Pass facility is expected to begin exporting natural 
gas in 2015, with an export capacity of 8 million tons per year
9
, and with all capacity already 
                                                          
6 See Tilak K. Doshi and Nahim Bin Zahur. Prospects for Trans-Pacific Energy Trade. Singapore: Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council, 2012. 
7 “Cheniere gets FERC approval for Sabine Pass LNG export facility”, at: 
http://www.marinelog/com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id-2277:cheni...  
8 See http://www.cheniereenergypartners.com/liquefaction_project/DOE_filings.shtml.  
9 The first two trains will commence operation in 2015-2016, and another two trains will commence in 2017-2018. 16 mtpa will 
be available once four trains are completed. Full operating capacity will thus be 16 million tons, available in 2017-2018. See 
http://phx.corporate-ir-net/phoenex.zhtml?c=207560&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1683623&highlight=.  
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committed.
10
 As indicated in Table II, Sabine Pass is only one of ten major LNG export projects 
currently planned in the United States, which are directed largely toward supplying the East 
Asian market. 
TABLE II: PROPOSED LNG EXPORT PROJECTS IN THE U.S. 
Applications Received by DoE/FE to Export Domestically Produced LNG from the Lower-48 
States (as of March 23, 2012) 
Company Location 
/ Quantity 
FTA 
Applications 
Non-FTA 
Applications 
Sabine Pass Liquefaction, 
LLC 
Gulf Coast 
2.2 Bcf/d 
Approved 
Sep. 2010 
Approved 
May 2011 
Freeport LNG Expansion, 
L.P. and FLNG 
Liquefaction, LLC 
Gulf Coast 
1.4 Bcf/d 
Approved 
Feb. 2011 
Under DoE 
Review 
Lake Charles Exports, 
LLC 
Gulf Coast 
2.0 Bcf/d 
Approved 
Jul. 2011 
Under DoE 
Review  
Carib Energy (USA) LLC South-Eastern 
0.03 Bcf/d: FTA 
0.01 Bcf/d: non-FTA 
Approved 
Jul. 2011 
Under DoE 
Review 
Dominion Cove Point 
LNG, LP  
East Coast 
1.0 Bcf/d 
Approved 
Oct. 2011 
Under DoE 
Review 
Jordan Cove Energy 
Project, L.P. 
West Coast 
1.2 Bcf/d 
Approved 
Dec 2011 
Under DoE 
Review 
Cameron LNG, LLC Gulf Coast 
1.7Bcf/d 
Approved 
Jan. 2012 
Under DoE 
Review 
Freeport LNG Expansion, 
L.P. and FLNG 
Liquefaction, LLC 
Gulf Coast 
1.4 Bcf/d 
Approved 
Feb. 2012 
Under DoE 
Review 
Gulf Coast LNG Export, 
LLC 
Gulf Coast 
2.8 Bcf/d 
Under DoE Review 
Cambridge Energy, LLC Southeast, Gulf Coast 
0.27 Bcf/d 
Pending 
Approval 
N.A. 
Total of all Applications Received 14.00 Bcf/d 13.71 Bcf/d 
Source: Office of Oil and Gas Global Security and Supply, Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Department of Energy 
Note: Bcf/d = billion cubic feet per day. 
                                                          
10 Some of this capacity is committed to non-Pacific buyers, suggesting that it may well be delivered partially to non-Pacific 
destinations, although that of course still remains uncertain. See http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=207560&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1653972&highlight= 
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Japan has also, it should be noted, historically purchased some LNG from Alaska, and will likely 
continue to do so in future, although those amounts so far have been relatively modest compared 
to Japan‟s other supplies.  
Apart from large and rapidly expanding LNG trade, substantial trans-Pacific investment 
in the Canadian oil sands is also in progress that may lead to future trans-Pacific oil exports, 
together with major infrastructure projects, such as the $2.3 billion Northern Gateway Pipeline in 
Canada. This pipeline will carry oil from the oil sands district of northern Alberta to Canada‟s 
Pacific coast, for export across the Pacific. Asian investment in Canadian oil sands projects and 
related infrastructure now totals well over $12 billion.  
A decade ago most trans-Pacific investment in North American energy was from Japan, 
but there has been a significant shift in recent years. Energy demand has surged in China, 
together with rising affluence, and an increasing share of investment is from China. Korea has 
also become a significant investor, facing fewer regulatory obstacles to its investments and 
exports from the United States than Japan, due to provisions of the US Natural Gas Act of 1938 
as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, stipulates preferential treatment, through a 
Department of Energy approval process, for   nations concluding free-trade agreements with the 
United States.
11
 Coal is historically an important part of trans-Pacific energy trade and 
investment, and cannot be neglected in future. It is particularly salient in Japan-Canada economic 
relations. Coal (mainly metallurgical, to fuel Japan‟s massive steel industry), is Canada‟s largest 
export to Japan, totaling $2.3 billion in 2009, or over 19 percent of Canadian exports.
12
  In 2011 
coal also surged into prominence in US-Japan relations, following the reduction in Japanese 
                                                          
11 On these regulatory details, see http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/How to Obtain Authorization 
to_Import_an.html.   
12 Japanese trade data, at: http://www.mofa.go.jp.  
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nuclear capacity in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, with American exports increasing 119 
percent, to almost 7 million tons.
13
 
Civilian nuclear power has traditionally been the energy sector where trans-Pacific 
interdependence has been the deepest. The Eisenhower Atoms for Peace program inspired the 
original siting of nuclear plants in Japan, and most of the early equipment—including the 
Fukushima nuclear plant itself—was supplied by American manufacturers. General Electric, for 
example, provided substantial capital equipment for nuclear plants to Tokyo Electric Power, both 
independently, and cooperatively with Toshiba. for many years was the largest American 
exporter to Japan and Tokyo Electric Power was the largest corporate importer from the United 
States, with the bulk of their mutual trade in the nuclear power area. Japan also has traditionally 
imported substantial amounts of nuclear fuel from the US—Y84.7 billion in 2010.14  Seven 
percent of Japan‟s uranium supplies, in total, come from the U.S., which is Japan‟s fifth largest 
supplier.
15
The nuclear industries of the U.S. and Japan are also intimately intertwined, with 
Toshiba owning Westinghouse as a subsidiary, and Hitachi and General Electric enjoying a 
longstanding joint-venture relationship. 
Many parts of the United States are natural energy partners for Japan, but among the most 
promising is Alaska. Geographically, it is the closest part of the U.S. to Japan, and it is notably 
well endowed with energy resources. In 2011 Alaska exported nearly $388 million in energy 
resources to Japan, including LNG, refined petroleum products, and coal. Over half of this total, 
                                                          
13 Bill Chappell, “U.S. Coal Exports Soar to 1991 Heights”, at: http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/04/10/150360355/u-
s-coal-exports-soar-to-199.  
14 See Ministry of Finance statistical database, at: 
http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/srch/index.htm?M=13&P=1,2.....4.1,2010,0,0,0,3,50105....1.....50.  
15 The other largest suppliers are Canada, Australia, Namibia, and Niger. See http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/energy-in-
japan/energy2006html/gragh/gfa.html.  
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or $198 million, consisted of LNG exports, and those will likely increase substantially in 
future.
16
   
Canada has also been an important participant in trans-Pacific energy trade
17
, including 
the nuclear dimension. Canada continues, for example, to serve as Japan‟s largest supplier of 
uranium ore, supplying well over a quarter of Japan‟s total imports.18 Total Japan-Canada trade 
in radioactive elements, including uranium, totaled 2.6 billion yen in 2010
19
. 
Over the past year since the Fukushima accident, nuclear regulators of the United States 
and Japan have been in intense communication with one another as never before on safety issues, 
but their dialogue will inevitably broaden.  Looking to the future, it is hard to see how Japan will 
be economically able to radically phase out its existing nuclear plants, despite continuing public 
opposition in the wake of the Fukushima accident. If and when Japanese nuclear plants resume 
operation on a larger scale, North America will no doubt once again play a significant role in 
providing both raw materials and services to Japan. And U.S. and Japanese firms will in any case 
continue to cooperate in garnering nuclear contracts in third countries, capitalizing on their 
advanced technology. 
The Fukushima accident, and the aging of existing Japanese nuclear plants, may in fact 
also open a new and quite dynamic area for U.S.-Japan energy cooperation. The United States, as 
a pioneer in the nuclear industry, has by definition many older nuclear plants, and substantial 
experience in the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. This experience will be valuable in 
                                                          
16 See “Alaska Exports Reach Record Highs”, at: http://gov.alaska.gov.  
17 Canada has, for example, exported CANDU reactors to South Korea, although not to Japan. 
18 See METI data, from: http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp.  
19 These figures are for Statistical Code 2488 (Radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes, etc.) See Trade Statistics 
of Japan database, at: thhp://www.customs.go.jp/English/tariff/2012_4data/i201204e_28.htm.  
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helping Japan deal with its current problems, and could be an area for deepened trans-Pacific 
partnership. 
The Emerging Trans-Pacific Energy Policy Agenda in an Era of Interdependence 
In a nation like Japan that imports nearly 99 percent of its oil and gas, adequate energy supply is 
naturally seen, almost instinctively, as a core element of national security. That instinctive 
dimension is arguably lacking in the United States and Canada, which perceive national 
security—especially in the U.S.—in more narrowly political-military terms. Conceptions of 
energy security on the two shores of the Pacific are complementary to one another, especially 
when the United States provides military security for Japan‟s energy sea lanes to the Persian 
Gulf, and for the political stability of key nations in the Gulf as well. Yet U.S. and Japanese 
conceptions of energy security, in particular, differ substantially in subtle, subjective dimensions. 
Japan and its North American partners have, however, developed a considerable level of 
trust with one another, including broad Japanese confidence in the transparency and stability of 
North American institutions, as well as the U.S.-Japan alliance. This confidence makes Japanese 
energy interdependence with North America attractive, especially given Tokyo‟s high current 
levels of dependence on the Persian Gulf for vitally needed hydro-carbons. The attractiveness is 
compounded by both the new availability of shale-gas supply, and the new Japanese domestic 
requirements for gas in the wake of Fukushima. 
Energy issues, of course, are embedded in larger parameters of political economy. To 
assure optimal cooperation on energy, including shale gas, more explicit Japanese support of the 
TPP framework would be helpful. The United States and Canada, for their part, should affirm 
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their commitment to free trade in energy, including shale gas, as potential for LNG exports 
begins to rise. 
It is important to keep in mind the tangible benefits to Japan, especially important in that 
strategic nation‟s fragile post-tsunami circumstances, that would flow from expanded access, 
under free-trade provisions, to North American natural gas supplies. Access to U.S. and 
Canadian natural gas, much of it no doubt derived from rapidly expanding shale-gas supplies on 
the continent, would afford Japanese distributors powerful leverage with Middle Eastern and 
other suppliers, forcing them to drop or revise traditional oil-linked pricing formulas that 
severely disadvantage Japan and impede its economic recovery. The availability of lower-cost 
North American gas under a free-trade regime would thus help reduce the burden of high energy 
prices that is impeding Japan‟s recovery.  
Flexible provision of expanded North American natural-gas supplies to Japan would also 
likely have tangible diplomatic benefits to the United States and Canada that would help 
strengthen trans-Pacific alliance relations. Expanded gas supplies would, for example, help 
reward Japan for its economically costly cooperation with Iran sanctions, help insure longer-term 
cooperation with those sanctions, and reduce resentment at special U.S. efforts to encourage 
China and South Korea to cut Iran procurements by compensatory benefits in the Arab Gulf, 
predominantly a traditional energy supplier for Japan. Expanded North American gas supplies 
for Japan could also slow the deepening of political-economic relations with Russia, a potentially 
important alternate energy partner for Tokyo.    
With the first authorizations for North American gas exports to Asia, including Japan, 
just now in progress, and with memories of the Fukushima tragedy still fresh, it is an excellent 
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time to deepen the trans-Pacific energy dialogue at the policy as well as the economic level. Such 
dialogue no doubt needs both bilateral and trilateral dimensions. To deepen and broaden their 
strategically important but politically delicate bilateral relationship, the United States and Japan 
need a forum for deliberating diverse issues of mutual energy security and efficiency in an 
ongoing fashion. Such a dialogue, potentially patterned after the SII talks of the early 1990s with 
their multiple policy baskets, could cover such diverse topics as nuclear safety, nuclear 
decommissioning, renewable energy, and smart grids and improved energy infrastructure, as well 
as energy efficiency. Involving multiple government agencies of both the United States and 
Japan, the Dialogue could also provide a role for working-level communication between 
embassies and local specialists in both nations. 
Canada, Japan, and the United States together also need more intense trilateral energy 
discussion. The three countries, after all, have substantial shared interests and concerns, as trans-
Pacific energy interdependence continues to rise. These shared interests center on maintaining 
free trade and transparent investment practices in the energy sector, while also assuring that 
trans-Pacific energy trade and investment does not undermine shared national-security concerns.  
IN CONCLUSION 
The trans-Pacific world is approaching a true critical juncture in the energy sphere. The Japanese 
and the North American shores of the Pacific share important core values of democracy and 
respect for free enterprise that make them natural partners. Until recently, however, they have 
engaged in remarkably little energy trade and investment, apart from coal and uranium, despite 
their intense interaction in other spheres.  
74   TOWARD A NEW ERA OF TRANS-PACIFIC ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE  
 
A new, much broader era of trans-Pacific energy interdependence is dawning. Both 
Canada and the United States are rapidly emerging as potentially substantial suppliers of LNG to 
Japan, just when Japan itself, in the wake of Fukushima, most needs those supplies. For both 
symbolic and substantive reasons, Canada, Japan, and the United States must grasp this historic 
opportunity to re-affirm the importance of free trade in energy, as it begins to accelerate across 
the Pacific; and to engage in a broadened energy dialogue that will examine in a far-sighted way 
avenues of cooperation that may steadily broaden in future. 
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